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OBSERVING AND IMPLEMENTING THE CULTURE 





Not too long ago, the label « artwork » was primarily limited 
to paintings, sculptures, drawings. Dance, music and drama were 
also considered « art forms », though audiences felt comfortable 
that only an occasional break of 'the fourth wall' would seriously 
challenge the labels. In the 20th Century, reconsideration were 
applied to architecture, craft, etcetera. Over the years, Walter 
Benjamin, John Cage, Jackson Pollock, Andy Warhol, and 
countless others had certainly revealed the incompleteness inherent 
in this labeling scheme (Benjamin, 1929; Cage, 1961; Dickie, 2000; 
Branden, 2003). Subsequently, it became popular to acknowledge 
that « anything could be art! » 
This seems equally disturbing. While originally, the label was 
used in ways the audience was not fully acknowledging, this 
alternative rendered the label fairly useless. Perhaps, a precise 
definition is elusive and subtle, but a distinction is made. Certainly, 
the thermostats on the wall at the Metropolitan Museum of Art do 
not receive the same attention as the paintings. Moreover, regarding 
the neurological and psychological effects of music (Bregman, 
1999; Levitin, 2006; Sacks, 2007; for interesting example cases). 
These effects can be more easily studied with music, since there 
                                                






exists a large, convenient corpus of work that adheres to a 
standardized protocol – Western music theory), it seems likely to 
surmise there actually may also be art-objects which yield some 
response that is very different than to others non-art-objects. 
 
 
Figure 1. A thermostat at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. 
Photo by author 
 
[The figures depicted] do not share the bulk and weight of earthly 
creatures. They are made of subtle mind-stuff ..., such stuff as 
composes the figures of our dreams and phantasies, or the divine 
apparitions that come before the concentrated inner vision of the 
yogi and devotee... Their corporeal incorporeality is a sublime form 
of Maya (Zimmer, 1946: 120). 
I make software-art, and am particularly interested in how 
machines might overcome the curiously coveted task of displaying 
intelligent behavior, despite fundamental impossibility to do so 
(Edelman, 1992: 211-252; Hawkins, 1995: 65-67). An intermediate 
understanding of how these tools (computers) work quite clearly 
reveals that even the slightest amount of complexity (Gordon, 1999: 
145-146) required cannot possibly occur within the machine1. But 
                                                
1  Briefly, the basic way that binary computation can be processed 
consistently, obeying both mathematics and physics, whether employing 
plumbing tubes, transistors or silicon chips, requires that all operations 
must be completed prior to being employed in a subsequent process; 
Computers only ever accomplish two-term elementary algebra (X 
[operator] Y = ?), albeit many equations, very fast, but exclusively one at a 
time. 




rather than argue such a point further here, there is a more 
interesting phenomenon to address. Namely that science (in 
general) has constructed a f ith, in much the same way that any 
tribe would. Faith has the subtle feature of appearing, on the 
surface, as passive explanation, though requiring underlying active 
conceptualization of experience, symbiotically constructing the 
world for the believer. 
Why anthropology? With the advent of Post-Post-Modernism, 
anthropological studies of cultures have been the content of art-
objects, art performances and displays. Most often the 
anthropologist-artist takes a somewhat distanced, cynical but 
heroically serious look into cultures assumed to be considered 
peculiar by audiences. Though modern anthropology aspires to, and 
often succeeds remarkably in making admirable strides to avoid 
« outsider » judgment, it is actually fundamentally impossible, from 
a neurological standpoint regarding perception, to accomplish 
exhaustively, to become an « insider » as an adult (Gregory, 1966; 
Asquith, 1984). The best we can do is to curb acting o  judgments. 
Though each human (anthropologist, artist, audience and computer 
programmer) is limited by psychology for better or worse, it is 
actually an intrinsic feature (of which we will take advantage) of 
the computer itself. The collection of artifacts excavated from 
trailer parks at the Museum of Jurassic Technology in Los Angeles 
comes to mind (indeed the entire museum, which began in 1987) 
(Weschler, 1996). There are certainly earlier examples (a more 
recent example is discussed in Wright, 2010a). Why not Cezanne? 
In this ethnographic scheme, the artist employs artistic media in 
order to describe (a personal relationship to) that culture. One might 
consider tribes inhabiting the Balinese jungle versus ay, the social 
organizations of ancient Maya. But the subject content is somewhat 
arbitrary. The bulk of the artist and audience membrs attention 
goes to the chosen medium (conceived of given a familiar 
conceptualization from « outside »), how the artist perceives that 
world (which includes the tools of that medium), and which aspects 
the artist prioritizes in rendering that subjective interpretation. 





by the artist to be intelligently organized, before even considering 
the object itself (Ossman, 2010). Whether that artist created the 
object, or found2 the object among some social group, it is 
recognized as eliciting some message specific to a specific culture. 
The object 'says something' about the (also assumed) environment. 
The audience, as well, further assumes that the objct must feature 
an intelligent message, to be displayed, and relished with social 
clues as to the object's importance. Thus, the task for the audience 
is to identify the precise nuance of the implicit culture. In cases 
where audience members are unfamiliar with the specific culture, 
there is still the assumption that the object is intrinsically 
meaningful. 
However, in this chapter we begin with somewhat an opposite 
premise, that the label « art » is not causally nor magically 
indicative, of meaning, that all objects only contain information that 
is apparent by physical means. This is not to say « rt » is bogus, 
rather that we are searching for how it functions at a deeper-than-
intellectualized level. The priorities (loosely « aesthetics ») of 
curators in the art world generally differ profoundly from say, the 
priorities (loosely « objectivity ») of theoreticians of Western 
sciences in academia. They represent two generally distinct 
cultures. Social scientist Carolyn Marvin describes attitudes in the 
United States at the turn of the dawn of the 20th Century. « A true 
and full appreciation of scientific knowledge was off limits to all 
except properly schooled experts who belonged to restricted textual 
communities » (1988: 42). This exclusivity remains deeply 
entrenched even today, upheld not just from territorial scientists 
defending valued positions, but even in the minds of the excluded 
with beliefs like « I'm not a math person ». However the art-science 
dichotomy has since proven an insufficient concept on a myriad of 
fronts. Un-learning these traditional boundaries in ever-deeper ways 
becomes essential – at least for the study of the mind. We are not 
« reaching across cultures » rather we are ignoring artificial 
distinctions that separate them. 
                                                
2  À la Marcel Duchamp (Dickie, op. cit.). 




In this latter scheme, we create potential artistic works by 
programmatic means, in order to observe how a specific culture 
(the art world) reacts to these various art-tests. We are researching 
if/how intelligence might be programmed, taking an u orthodox 
step away from computer science and boolean (digital) pragmatism, 
informed rather by anthropology, looking at a specific culture's (the 
art world) response to artworks. One might object that submitting 
artwork to art shows in order to ask « Is it art? » is a circular 
argument. However, there are two main differences hre. Firstly, 
we do not actually care about any particular art-object. The fate of a 
given piece is inconsequential. Secondly, we are not concerned 
with proving or disproving that art exists, just as we would not 
attempt to prove to the natives worshipping tree spirit  that they are 
in error. Quite the opposite, the belief in tree spirits holds some 
very practical purpose, specific to that tribe's consensus about their 
environment, an environment which we may be physically 
incapable (having developed different perception) of seeing in the 
same way3. What we are interested in is that people seem to behave 
in an unconscious, yet fairly consistent manner toward whatever it 
is that they feel is art. 
 
Framing 
Why is art necessary? This may seem like a facetious 
question, however, by taking an anthropological approach to the 
« art scene », the field becomes our lab for closer scrutiny. Let us 
back up momentarily to a better vantage point. Experiments reveal 
that recognition of – and not presence of – intelligent organization 
in music is key (Becker, 2004; Cohen, 2006; Wright, 2010b). This 
recognition strategy is seen in variety of modalities and 
media-types. The distinction was especially salient n the transition 
from silent film to talkies, where new conceptualizt ons had to be 
constructed before interpretations of perceptions could take place 
(Eyman, 1997). History paused to reconsider the theater aspect of 
                                                
3  The French hear vowels Americans can’t, who hear L’s in ways Japanese 





the Cartesian Theater. It is central to our constructed concepts of 
mathematics (Lakoff &  Núñez, 2000). In Noam Chomsky's seminal 
work (1957), an example he uses is that we can differentiate 
between sentences that are potentially meaningful tho gh ultimately 
not, and ones that could not possibly convey meaning. We 
recognize something about « Colorless green ideas sl ep furiously » 
that we know is not present in « Furiously sleep ideas green 
colorless » (p. 15). 
It is essential to recognize that the feat that distinguishes 
organic brains is not simply a single step of calculation. Rather 
than identification being a single-step task, as is commonly 
assumed, it is at least threefold (Millikan, 2000: 1 9-116). This has 
special significance to anthropological studies of foreign cultures 
who most certainly will identify, not only the content and relevant 
descriptions differently than the researcher, but fundamentally see 
or not see the same objects given like views of thesame 
environment. For meaning to occur, involves tight integration of the 
ability to (1) interpret the output, including its (often implicit) 
relationship to the (3) input. This « curation » is generally 
transparent to all who come into contact with the technology. 
Inevitably, programmers of Artificial Intelligence (AI ) software 
tends to organize data in a way that seems intelligent to us. In 
understanding how to relate to our tools, we necessarily project our 
own profoundly idiosyncratic conceptualizations onto them. This 
under-appreciated difficulty in assessing intelligenc , stems the 
same impulsive projective nature of intelligence, under 
investigation. No human could interpret behavior without doing so 
through his/her own conceptualizations (Cohen, op. cit.). For 
instance, HS Terrace's remarks about ethology and teaching 
language to non-human primates, describes the problem facing 
computer science and AI . 
In the rush to demonstrate grammatical competence in the ape, many 
projects ([Terrace's] Project Nim included overlooked functions of 
individual signs (apart from their demand function. Of greater 
significance, from a human point of view, are the ability to use a 
word simply to [spontaneously] communicate information and to 
refer to things that are not present (Terrace, 1984: 200). 




We seek some indication that the machine a d the operator 
are not merely symbiotically learning to create outputs, which 
satisfy that operator. Resulting theories, which oterwise may be 
constructed quite firmly, may include reporting on a d reacting to 
« subjective » emotional states (Minsky, 2006). 
Categorization 
It is important to acknowledge that only once we comprehend 
what we are seeing can the sensory stimuli, such as documentation, 
be given attention, and is no longer « background noise ». This 
includes grouping4 and categorization5. Categorization, how we 
determine which shapes/colors belong to a chimpanzee w  are 
observing, or which movements are intentional gestur  of a dance 
ceremony, is certainly subjective. Moreover, both are culturally 
learned. An object is recognized as an apple becaus it fits well 
enough within the « apple » category and not well within others. 
But grouping is subtler, though no less influential here. For 
instance, pretend you have met a person who has come fr  a tribe 
in India, that somehow has almost never had much influe ce from 
the West. You are giving an informal crash-course in pop culture. 
You sing the song « Yellow Submarine » by the Beatles a cappella 
(we'll pretend you do a flawless rendition). 
In the town 
Where I was born, 
Lived a man 
Who sailed to sea (Lennon/McCartney, 1966). 
Each line of the verse begins with several « pick up » notes. 
So it is perhaps ambiguous where exactly the main beat would go. 
To a Westerner, where the lines of the song are arranged as written 
above, the beat is perceived at the beginning of the final word. This 
is beat one of four. But to your friend from India, beat 4, the beat 
                                                
4  Grouping is discussed in auditory scene analysis by Bregman, (op. cit.); 
see also Cohen (op. cit.) for more abstract ramifications of grouping in 
audition/kinesthesis. 
5  Categorization is discussed extensively in mental representation by 





just before the first word of each line, or the ending of the last held 
word, is dominant. Thus the friend would perceive the music 
differently, though singing the song back, the rendition would 
sound much the same. We are predisposed by the culture in which 
we were raised to distinguish boundaries between observed entities, 
as well as behaviors. The modality is irrelevant. We might also 
imagine how a person unfamiliar with written English, would view 
a page from a book as a design filling all but the borders. Whereas 
someone else (us) may see the characters as distinct entities, words, 
with symbolic meaning. This meta-phenomenology is inescapable. 
I want to, at least temporarily, look at how technology, such as a 
camera, can be used with appreciation for this larger context, rather 
than discussing the use of technology exclusively in terms of one 
limited use for it – documentation. 
To do so, one needs to reconsider behavior as a form of 
communication, insofar as it is intentional and designed to 
communicate, if only to attain an appropriate reaction from the 
environment. Non-human organisms are scarcely implied to have a 
Theory of Mind (Whiten, 1998; Gopnick &  Meltzoff, 2006; Fodor, 
2000). Instead, as with human infants, before developing any sense 
of self or distinguishes others, the child assumes th  universe is 
simply an extension of the self (Piaget, 1929). It is as if the child is 
unaware of experiencing internally, for there is no clear distinction 
yet between internal and external thought. In this way, studies of 
the developing mind, form our understanding of the behavior of 
apes. Likewise it enhances our understanding of how to observe 
possibly intelligent behavior in human and non-human primates, as 
well as machines. 
It may simply be tempting to place the origins of thematic structure 
further back still, in the real world, and to say that there is an act of 
giving, that act logically includes as its minimal participants, 
someone who gives (Agent), something that is given (Patient) and 
someone whom that thing is given (Goal). However, to adopt such a 
position neglects the fact that acts of giving have no separate 
existence in nature, but occur as part of an unbroken pattern of 
behavior that we happen to segment in a certain way... (Bickerton, 
1990: 185-186). 




Two variations of projected intelligence 
For over a decade now, most of my artwork is related to two 
key investigations. One is the work of Richard Gregory on the eye 
and brain (Gregory &  Ramachandran, 1991; Hunt, 1993: 442). The 
eye is not an isolated system, but plays a smaller ro  in instigating 
thoughts. Of particular note is his short film of a D lmatian walking 
through snow patches. From a still image, it is difficult to identify 
the scene. However, in motion, the scene becomes clear. So long as 
the dog is moving, the brain draws imaginary outlines of it. It uses 
Gestalt rules to do so (Hunt, ibid.: 442-460). What is peculiar about 
this phenomenon is that Gestalt rules apply not justo visual 
organization, but rather well to audio scene analysis (Bregman, op. 
cit.). I would further hypothesize that these Gestalt rules function 
well beyond modality and sensory analysis to conceptual analysis at 
a more fundamental level. 
The other experiment is ELIZA , the AI  program by 
Weizenbaum (1966). The program appears as a simple text editor. 
It claims to be a computer therapist and begins by asking (in text) 
how you feel today. Let's say we answer with « Fine, but my tooth 
is bothering me ». ELIZA might reply « Why is your tooth 
bothering you? » It utilizes a well-known trick from psychology, 
repeating part of something just said. We have already given 
meaning to the words, so when we hear them back, assume the 
question is meaningful as well. ELIZA appears intelligent, though 
the meaning is entirely projected. 
Both cases, seem also to relate to the perceptual magnet effect 
(PME), as studied in spoken and musical sounds (Patel, 2008: 
79-84). The conceptual categorizations of chaotic audio is prone to 
be interpreted as a particular iconic, expected note or phoneme. 
When the source is fairly similar to the exemplar, this would be 
expected. But there is a grey area, where the source is perceived as 
being closer than it actually is. This magnet-like tendency recurs, 
not just in perception, but general comprehension. Both Gregory’s 
and Weizenbaum’s experiments borrow our instinctual 





of communication (henceforth IPTPC), applying it to the inanimate 
screen. 
 
What is a « system »? 
Aside from the obvious modality differences, music and 
visual art are subject to unique epiphenomenal experiences. One 
can listen to a discordant series of notes, and say « that doesn't 
sound right », but there's nothing one could paint or sculpt or ... to 
elicit that same feeling. One might decide that the colors clash, but 
this intellectual decision would not feel the same at all to us. This 
indicates that our bodies look for some sort of understood system in 
music, and not in art, and respond in some pre-consci u , visceral 
way. It may be tempting to say that interpretation s shaped by 
culture, however it is merely a result of the current neural process, 
though it is as if culture is the foreman of the construction of those 
neural networks. However, the primary difference is that the 
formalized ruleset that is music theory is a great deal easier to 
recognize, while it is unclear if and how exactly a ruleset might be 
consistently applied to visual objects. We can think of the 
experience of qualia as distinct from the effect of phenomena where 
modalities are but arbitrary vehicles between the environment and 
the mind. 
Pictographic systems 
Phonemes and alphabetic characters generally bear no logical 
relationship to their referents (Bickerton, 1990: 52- 4), nonetheless 
we often try to project a relationship from a few coincidental 
examples. The Japanese character for mountain does lo k a bit like 
a mountain. However, Chinese characters (the most extensive part 
of the Japanese writing system) are usually comprised of four 
sections, where each section has a different role in the meaning of 
the word (Coe, 1993: 17–33), and not necessarily a visual feature. 
Suffice it say, written language is a negotiated « system » used to 




interface minds6. It is not a representation to convey what the writer 
observes in the hopes that the reader sees the symbol as referring to 
the same thing, and is being used by similar semantics to construct 
the intended message. 
Perhaps one might say things like Egyptian hieroglyphs – or 
simply the decorations in King Tut's tomb – are depiction. To the 
ancient Egyptians though, hieroglyphs are not considered for 
aesthetics or creative self-expression (Pinker, op. cit.: 89-91; 
Crystal, 2005: 107-109). A better candidate might be perspectival 
rules from the Renaissance (Solso, 2003: 189-201). But this is a 
grey area at best, since the rules were essentially just observations 
of physical phenomena, not inventions or intended prsonalized 
variations. 
Visual art, as well as sound is often subject to gestalt 
principals. A detailed discussion of this is Bregman (op. cit.). 
Gestalt might seem like a formal system for visual information. But 
since gestalt rules are, for the most part, not generally, radically 
revised by intentional interactivity (Hunt, op. cit.: 280-310), they do 
not precisely qualify in our re-definition of a system. In the same 
way, gravity works somewhat systematically, but is not considered 
a system. We might then think of « system » as a synon m for 
« protocol ». Sensory information is fairly meaningless, until it has 
been interpreted by the brain, which attempts to fit the stimuli into 
the cookie-cutter shapes it has available, as best it can. Any node 
can send any protocol to any other, but only when both nodes are 
primed to the same protocol is a transmission successful. In the case 
of a videographer pointing the camera at some behavior, though the 
camera is merely employed as a medium, with the assumption the 
viewer will share a like protocol. This protocol assumes similar 
experiential ethology to distinguish what are behaviors worth 
watching, and what are simply « signal noise ». 
Transduction and actualization 
The problem becomes much clearer when we broaden our 
                                                
6  For further discussion of constructivism, see Vygotsky, 1978; Allen, 





assumed definitions of the senses, to speak in electrical engineering 
terms of transducers7 and actualizers, rather than input/output of 
media. Color is not a feature eyes detect. The eyes sendtimuli to 
the brain, which manufactures qualia in a very specific protocol, 
only used by this illusionary Cartesian Theater. The t eater cannot 
be proven to exist, is not likely, but is metaphorically experienced 
nonetheless. It is convincing in the same way a person born on the 
stage and with no ability to leave, with flimsy sets and props that 
may not be functional, but look real enough from the audience's 
perspective. Such an actor might think the universe is really like 
that stage, that guns only shoot blanks and windows are essentially 
the same thing as a painted landscape. In other words, the first step 
is to re-conceptualize colors, not as input but as output. Output that 
is exclusively applicable to a particular mental context and not for 
the benefit of the rest of the universe. 
Frogs react quickly and effectively to bugs that fly past them, but 
this by no means implies that they have a concept of « bug ». Indeed, 
we can be pretty sure that they do not, or at best that their concept of 
« bug » both under- and over-generalizes to a rather gross extent. For 
instance, they will overgeneralize by snapping at bug-sized pellets 
that are flipped past them, but will undergeneralize by totally 
ignoring motionless bugs even when no other food source is 
available. (Bickerton, 1990: 27-28) 
Jellyfish skin is very delicate. It is easily damaged by light. 
Thus, when the jellyfish detects that too much light is hitting it, the 
fish sinks to deeper, darker waters. Is the jellyfish aware of this 
detection? Given the neural anatomy – or profound lack thereof – 
of the jellyfish, this is surely not the case. Does the jellyfishes feel 
uncomfortable in too much light, and seeks comfort? This is 
speculative, but highly unlikely. It is ultimately impossible, of 
course, to determine the precise point at which an creature’s mind is 
aware of that creature’s behavior or reasons for it. Though it would 
be ridiculous to imagine that the jellyfish has any concept of things 
like « skin » or « light ». 
 
                                                
7  À la Cognitive Scientist, Zenon Pylyshyn, 1984. 




A Function of trance 
Joscelyn Godwin describes the teachings of Suhrawardi 
(1153-1191) (1986: 82–87). He became figure in Sufism, but was 
ultimately executed. Suhrawardi believed that while Plato was 
correct in nearly everything, he was speaking of a mythical world 
that lies between the world of Angelic Intelligences and the 
material world we inhabit. These worlds are separated by 
« Lights », lying within the celestial spheres, which justify the 
harmony of music, as well as the « heart ». Certainly, it may be said 
that some confusion arises in respect to modalities, it may also be 
said that the modalities themselves must be reconsidered. An apt 
modality that warrants further discussion, that perhaps Suhrawardi 
is even inadvertently referring to, is trance. 
While we have long observed trance in most cultures 
throughout the world, it is often given a very different 
understanding in Western cultures (Campbell, 1949). Gilbert 
Rouget (1980/1985) uses the terms « trance » and « ecstasy » to 
refer to what he emphatically declares are two distinct mental 
states. The contrast in externally observable behaviors is certainly 
extraordinarily salient. According to his view, trance is reached 
through rituals involving excited music and dance. Ecstasy is 
reached meditatively, with the exclusion of sensory « distractions ». 
Another difference he observes is that trance occurs involuntarily, 
and ecstasy requires a learned effort. This view has been discarded 
in two important ways. Numerous brain scans of several kinds have 
revealed that these distinct states are actually neurologically 
indistinguishable. This has an important implication, which brings 
about our second revision. To reach this brain state, there are 
cultural rituals of a huge spectrum employed, from extreme solitude 
to rituals involving the entire tribe. In other words, internally – as 
opposed to the perspective of a removed observer, though the 
« syntax » of the ritual may vary widely, as with language, the 
underlying « meaning » may be essentially the same. 
Mere observation, a general stance Rouget's view assumes, of 
these rituals falls short of recognizing the underlying mechanism. 





ceremonies and behaviors, incite transcendence. That transcendence 
may be more specifically identified as Buddhist enlightenment or a 
shaman's journey to the underworld. Whether it is labe ed one way 
or another is ultimately an incidental byproduct of the subject's 
understanding of the social environment (Vitebsky, 1995). But in 
either case, the potential purpose of the ceremony is learned from 
culture after gradual assimilation and repeated experience. 
(Pertinent details of myth and ritual are outlined in Campbell &  
Moyers, 1988). The West, particularly due to the influences of 
Descartes and Plato, seems to have a peculiar bias against losing 
tight control of the self (Roseman, 1991: 179-184). An essential 
step in delineating the environment from the self, involves 
rendering the world using the mental media tools made vailable 
socially, to see where divisions might lie. However, there is no a 
priori reason to assume such a division is « real », rather than 
cultural (Sells, 1996). 
All cultures may have a reflexive personal pronoun to refer to the 
speaker, but not all have the nominalized disengaged, objectified 
« self » commonplace in Western thought... In exploring the 
possibility of the correlation between the willingness and ability to 
accept spirit possession [or relinquishment of self] and certain ideas 
of selfhood, we need to be able to imagine both what our ideas of 
selfhood are and what some others might be. I believe that the notion 
of self… has, throughout the history of the colonization of North 
America, worked to exclude the acceptability of spirit ossession and 
trancing... 
Integrating the insights of phenomenology and those of neuroscience 
means reexamining two ideas with profound roots in Western 
intellectual history; ideas that have provided us with a bedrock of 
stability for both science and religion; ideas that have spawned 
spectacular scientific discoveries and sustained profound religious 
values. Nonetheless, some concepts central to our world 
understanding may have inhibited our search for the ways that we 
can be transformed by music and by trancing. 
These two related ideas are so much part of our intellec ual heritage 
that they are not considered to be concepts or theoies but « facts ». 
1. There is an objective world outside myself that s definable 
properties and 
2. I am a single, bounded, unitary consciousness that rationally 
perceives that objective world and thinks and acts on the basis of 




« correct » perceptions or representations of that world... 
… We perceive according to our past bodily experiences and in 
order to change an ingrained perception, we need to physically 
interact with the novel environment (Becker, op. cit.: 92 &  108). 
 
Borrowing intelligence 
One example of Borrowed Intelligence, from the years before 
computers were widely available, occurs commonly in Muslim 
societies (Quraishi, 2008). Four times a day, payer-songs are 
broadcast from speakers throughout the region. There is a mystical 
connection between human musicians and listeners. But it does not 
stand to reason that the same mysticism resides within he 
machines. At no point do the machines mean one random set of 
vibrating air molecules, rather than another8. In general, Quraishi 
points out that Muslims have a strong disdain for technology, so it 
is unlikely that the machines are considered to be cr ating 
intelligent messages. It is the message received, by the devoted 
listeners, that is imbued with special significance – only in the act 
of hearing, not in the playing, nor in the air betwen. 
Speaking and understanding language may not seem not 
easily reducible to this idea of transducer/actuator. However, 
Chomsky (op. cit.: 15) revealed a subtle but crucial nuance. There 
is a detection and response that is culturally assimilated and 
essential just prior to the actual parsing of syntax. As mentioned 
previously, we recognize the sentence « Colorless green... » as 
being potentially worth further scrutiny, whereas « Green 
colorless... » can be dismissed as non-sense immediately. This 
criteria is entirely dependent on our conception of what nouns are 
and how verbs apply to them, etcetera. It may seem an 
oversimplification to call this the grammar of thought (Fodor, 
                                                
8  One might be tempted to argue that the amplifiers are no less tools than 
the musical instruments. However, that implies the holy message imparted 
by the musicians is also imparted by whoever presses th  PLAY button. 
Because this occurs so frequently, it is likely that in some cases, an 





1975). In fact, it is useful as a model to reconsider the senses as 
potential meaning detection systems. 
Open calls as tests 
An in-obvious avenue of exploration is the Open Call for 
computer art. Curators representing galleries and museums around 
the world often post requests for artist to send proposals and/or 
samples of artwork. From the responses, often number thousands, a 
few are chosen for displaying in the show. Since our interest is 
whether or not the end product of our system is compelling or not, 
this appears a fair test. Two features of these competitions make 
them all the more salient. Firstly, curators notoriously tend to be 
disinterested in technical issues. The justification is generally that 
the computers are unemotional, thus computation is deemed 
mutually exclusive to emotional expressiveness – despite that much 
of modern art using traditional media, including video, makes 
absolutely no concerted attempt in this regard. In fact, the informal 
trend seems toward elusive or entirely concealed emotion, at least 
to those uninitiated into that art world. True, some curators are 
actually more technophiles than technophobes. However, even they 
tend to be wary of science that goes too far beyond subjective 
experience and/or focus on sensorial output, akin to surface 
grammar. 
This actually anti-computation bias makes for an ideal 
environment for us. Secondly, the competition for which works are 
chosen is rather high. Surely a great deal of works that are deemed 
« OK », are not selected, while even ones deemed « great » are 
surely rejected due to limited space. Thus if a piece appears overtly 
un-emotive or un-creative, there are certainly several other pieces to 
choose from. Recall however, that we are not attemping to 
generate pleasing artwork, simply artwork that engages people who 
are resistant to being engaged by machines. We are looking for 
indication if the resulting work is ever « colorless green », rather 
than « green colorless » (Chomsky, op. cit.: 15). No further 
assumptions are made that the same piece would be interpreted the 
same elsewhere. It stands to reason that we are all initi ly drawn to 




varying qualities in varying contexts to varying degr es. 
Of about 60 pieces, submitted 1–4 times, from about 2007 to 
2010, about 10 were chosen in a fair amount of Calls. The criteria 
of a « fair amount » is necessarily vague. Pieces that were 
submitted many times, but only appeared in smaller shows or shows 
with a single non-professional curator, do not meet th  criteria. 
Those that were seen in only one much larger show, with stiffer 
competition, and a judging panel of several « expert » curators do 
meet the criteria. Not that we are judging the quality of the judges, 
offering « better » judgment, rather that experienced judges more 
often tend to make, and trust, their own intuitive decisions in this 
regard. Generally, multiple positive opinions that are voluntarily 
given are taken to indicate, not so much that this is « good art », but 
that the piece is not simply perceived as mechanical. The point is to 
discover if – and not which – works could be generally evocative. 
Can a computer be implemented in the creation of worlds, for 
someone? More importantly though, can the computer cr ate the 
stimuli, rather than the human programmer (who is assumed to be 
an intelligent organism) explicitly crate it, only employing the 
computer as a medium to deliver that creation? In other words, is 
the recognition of intelligent organization a result of an intellectual 
(post-socialization, from a computational perspective) process or 




Whether internally in the mind, or externally in the teaching 
process, didactic methods are detours to development and learning 
(Vygotsky, 1986: 101-102, 150; Fosnot &  Perry, op. cit.) and 
ubiquitous in hard sciences, particularly computer programming. 
Code itself is necessarily a tightly ordered list of explicit 
instructions. Where constructivist teaching is absent, learners must 
create mental games for themselves based on those didactic 
instructions, if any learning is to take place (Dewey, 1910: 32-35, 





we even begin to considered AI , we need to investigate whether 
some artificial system can actually demonstrate intellig nce at all. 
Given our human reflex to create interpretations of meaning, 
empirical studies in AI  have yielded only dubious results. An 
anthropological study is not an empirical one. Cultural studies are 
not quantitative. However, perhaps subjectivity is exactly what 
needs to be applied – albeit in a less intuitive way, as we shall see. 
Certainly, attention has long been called to the influence of 
the observer on the observed in anthropology, as well as quantum 
physics. What may not be obvious though, in the enthusiasm for 
novel technology, is that this problem has not actully gone away. 
In recent decades, the video camera has been employed t  allow 
researchers a kind of displacement in the field andbypass the 
problem. However, this does not address the fundamental issue of 
framing. Not that the camera cannot be considered an « objective 
observer », but that the description is rendered meaningless once 
the footage is given context. As with software, context is essential 
for comprehension, often an overlooked nuance of observation. 
Once footage is interpreted, as a ritual observed from a distance, 
from a « third-person perspective » (Harris, 1984; Dennett, op. cit.: 
70-72, 95-98), the visual aspect becomes a distracting souvenir of 
some exotic event. 
What may be even less obvious is that, while there r ally are 
no distinct cultures, one simply blurs into the rest, extremes do 
exist. The culture of the art world, though impossible to distinguish 
precisely, can be addressed as if it were a foreign tribe, in an 
unfamiliar habitat, by assimilating into a culture, in this case the art 
world, rather than being a remote observer of it, development of 
discourse takes a very different path (Sfard, op. cit.: 163-194). Art 
historians and critics may have insights for the art world. 
Nonetheless, more fundamentally, for the cognitive sciences, a 
helpful role is that of the artist. Thus we become co-creators of 
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In order to investigate the broader issue of synthesis of intelligence in 
man-made systems, by putting aside the argument whether or not 
intelligence is feasible by computational means alone, we are in a better 
vantage point to assess, not how, but where various positions in this 
argument lie. One curious faction, that is particularly relevant to 
perceptions of intelligence, appears in the culture of the art world. The 
anthropologist can take a missionary stance or a native one – as an artist. 
Rituals, necessarily in a continual state of flux, can be engaged in and 
modified from within. We can then ask, how does the culture of the art 
world approach computation and meaning? 
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L’intelligence empruntée : observer et mettre en œuvre la culture du 
monde de l’art 
Afin de pouvoir examiner au sens large du terme, les manifestations de la 
synthèse de l'intelligence humaine au sein des systèmes produits par 
l'homme, tout en mettant de côté les arguments qui consistent à affirmer ou 
à s'opposer à l'idée que l'intelligence est reproductible uniquement par les 
moyens computationnels, nous avons choisi une position plus intéressante, 
non pas en situant la manière mais plutôt en partant de l'espace où nos 
différents arguments peuvent se nicher. Une curieuse faction, qui paraît 
particulièrement importante pour la perception de l'intelligence, réside dans 
la culture du monde de l'art. L'anthropologue peut se positionner en tant 
que missionnaire ou en tant qu'autochtone, comme un artiste. Les rituels, 
inévitablement dans un flux constant, peuvent se dérouler et être modifiés 
de l'intérieur. On peut se demander alors, comment le monde de la culture 
de l'art perçoit le numérique et le sens. 
 
Mots-clefs : art, intelligence artificielle, ondes cérébrales, dispositif 
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